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Over the last decade, Brazil has taken a more 
substantial role in international peace and 
security, and has become increasingly in-
volved in UN peace operations. Particularly 
through its participation in Haiti, leading 
the military component of the UN Stabiliza-
tion Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Brazil 
has underscored its growing engagement 
in shaping, challenging and adding to con-
ventional practices of conflict management 
and peace processes. Now, the prospective 
withdrawal of MINUSTAH, coupled with a 
current domestic scenario in Brazil of politi-
cal and economic instability, raises a num-
ber of questions about the future of Brazil’s 
participation and role in peacekeeping. To 
contribute to critical and well-informed con-
versations on the challenges and potentials 
of Brazil’s engagement in peacekeeping amid 
turbulent landscapes at home and interna-
tionally, this policy brief revisits the country’s 
evolving role and strategic use of peacekeep-
ing, and reflects upon its implementation in 
light of the normative developments brought 
by the current international process to review 
UN peace operations. The brief concludes 
that a continued peacekeeping presence, 
despite current difficulties, remains  
desirable for Brazil.
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The project ‘Brazil’s Rise to the Global Stage: 
Humanitarianism, Peacekeeping and the Quest 
for Great Powerhood’ (BraGS) is funded by 
the Norwegian Research Council’s Latina-
merika program, and aims to understand 
Brazil’s international ambitions through its 








4. The latest report (31 August 2016) of the 
Secretary-General on MINUSTAH recom-
mended the mandate to be extended until 
15 April 2017 (see www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/753)
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same time they should not prevent the country 
from contributing to current and future missions.
Moreover, Brazil’s continued engagement in UN 
PKOs is not only desirable from a foreign policy per-
spective, it is also expected by Brazilian constituen-
cies, primarily the Army, but also the Navy, and by 
key international actors, especially the UN (mainly 
the Secretariat), Western countries and several de-
veloping countries, particularly those who already 
contribute with troops or police. Brazil has been 
able to overcome other domestic challenges before, 
such as in the economic and political recessions 
of the 1990s, and it is much more qualified and 
mature to do it again in present times. While not 
necessarily leading to immediate economic and ma-
terial gains, Brazil’s continued participation in UN 
PKOs remains desirable to showcase the country’s 
capacity and willingness to engage internationally. 
Continued Brazilian participation would not only 
be good news for Brazil’s strategic interests, but also 
for global governance and the future of peacekeep-
ing operations.  
Notes
1. The only exception is between late 1966 and 
early 1989, when Brazil did not participate in 
any international mission, including peace-
keeping. This period more or less coincides 
with the military regime (1964-1985).
2. MONUSCO received a new Force Com-
mander in December 2015.
3. The National Policy of Defense and National 
Strategy of Defense were both revised and 
updated in 2012 (see www.defesa.gov.br/
arquivos/estado_e_defesa/END-PND_Opti-
mized.pdf). Both documents refer to peace-
keeping on only five occasions, to determine 
that Brazil should have more responsibilities 
in UN missions (without details) and to em-
phasize that its participation should be based 
on national interests.
Managing Uncertainties Abroad with 
Uncertainties at Home?
Economic decline and domestic politics on stormy 
waters are present circumstances that raise ques-
tions as to Brazilian commitments abroad, and 
even cast considerable doubts as to the country’s 
not so long ago praised status as a rising power 
on the global stage. Further, the conclusion of the 
impeachment process in August – leading to the 
removal of President Dilma Rousseff and to Vice-
President Michel Temer taking over as Brazil’s head 
of state – did not come without challenging tasks on 
the foreign policy front. In his inaugural speech,5 
Temer’s Foreign Minister José Serra, focusing 
prominently on the country’s struggling economy, 
reinforced a global strategy centered around trade 
and economic-related matters. While not explicitly 
mentioning UN PKOs, Serra suggested that Brazil’s 
international role should avoid engagements that 
generate scarce economic gains at the expense of 
high diplomatic and material costs. Bringing the 
economy back to terms and increasing the country’s 
competitiveness and productivity are understand-
able and much-needed moves under current cir-
cumstances. However, in and of themselves, they 
fall short of promoting the interests and revamping 
the strategic importance of a key political and mili-
tary player on the global stage.
Nevertheless, sustained attention and disposition 
to contribute to UN PKOs in the future should re-
main part of Brazil’s foreign policy portfolio. Brazil 
takes a lot of pride in its contributions to the UN, 
and the organization has brought into effect many 
principles and values that guide the country’s inter-
national role. Similarly, Brasília’s proactive engage-
ment with PKOs is crucial for a richer and more 
comprehensive debate on global security issues, 
contributing to developing knowledge, to balanc-
ing Western dominance and to finding solutions to 
international instabilities. Structural shortcomings 
and uncertainties at home may temporarily restrict 
Brazil from expanding its participation, but at the 
• Brazil has increasingly taken on 
responsibilities and claimed more 
proactive roles in handling crises 
through UN missions.
• Despite Brazil’s increased ability 
to contribute to and engage in 
peacekeeping, a series of structural 
shortcomings constrains the country’s 
ability to advocate for normative change 
and aspire to more influential roles at 
UN platforms.  
• Brazil’s peacekeeping approaches can 
both contribute to and benefit from the 
recommendations of the HIPPO report.
• Notwithstanding the political and 
economic downtrend currently affecting 
the country, sustained attention 
and disposition to contribute to UN 
peacekeeping operations should remain 
part of Brazil’s foreign policy portfolio.
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Background: The State of UN 
Peacekeeping
The recent 70th anniversary of the United Nations, 
the upcoming selection of a new Secretary-General 
and last year’s release of the report of the High-Lev-
el Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) 
all provide timely opportunities to reflect upon how 
actors engage with one of the UN’s most visible and 
long-standing activities: peacekeeping operations 
(PKOs). Throughout their existence since the late 
1940s, and with mixed successes, PKOs have varied 
in mandate and size, reflecting the changing politi-
cal dynamics of the international system, and they 
have largely evolved based on empirical experiences 
and technological advances.
Although peacekeeping decision-making and main-
stream approaches remain largely influenced  by 
the great powers, the complex demands and expec-
tations facing UN PKOs since the end of the Cold 
War have progressively led to a more pronounced 
and assertive engagement of actors outside the West 
(Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Under these circum-
stances, and reflecting the significant transforma-
tions in both the dynamics and power relations 
within the international system, peacekeeping has 
been increasingly perceived by many Southern 
countries, including Brazil, as a fundamental tool 
with which to seek a greater international profile, 
to gain prestige, and to highlight their support and 
commitment to multilateral institutions (Kenkel, 
2010). With their growing involvement, Southern 
countries have also sought to break the North-South 
paradigm in which “problems” are restricted to the 
South while “solutions” are brought by the North, 
contributing to put forward alternative ideas and 
options, and challenging mainstream peacekeeping 
footprints.
 Brazil’s Evolving Role in Peacekeeping
Brazil has played a key role in UN peacekeeping 
since the 1990s. During the Cold War, the country 
also contributed with a constant, albeit small, num-
ber of military and police since the very first UN op-
eration, in 1947.1 Altogether, Brazil has participated 
in 43 of the 71 peacekeeping missions authorized 
by the UN Security Council, or 61% of the total. 
Throughout these seven decades of engagement, 
the past 25 years – which similarly corresponded 
to peacekeeping’s post-Cold War quantitative and 
qualitative expansion – have been the most signifi-
cant period. This is reflected in the number of mis-
sions that included Brazilian peacekeepers, but also 
in the total number of Brazilians actually deployed 
to UN missions. In December 1990, for example, 
Brazil participated in only three UN peacekeeping 
missions, while in December 2015 this number had 
increased to ten (out of the 16 existing missions at 
the time). In terms of the numbers of troops and 
police, Brazil has sent almost 50,000 uniformed 
personnel to UN peacekeeping missions since 1947, 
the vast majority (87%) being deployed in the past 
25 years alone (Hamann, 2016). In other words, it 
is only recently that Brazil has started to organize 
its engagement in UN peacekeeping as a tool of its 
foreign policy. It is doing so not only to contribute to 
international order, but mainly to promote its inter-
ests regionally and globally, and to expand its role in 
the international system.
This recent engagement can be directly associated 
with the priorities of Brazilian foreign policy, as 
confirmed by disaggregated data on each UN mis-
sion that received Brazilians between 1990 and 
2015. During that period, when the host countries 
and regions were a high priority for Brazil, the UN 
mission received large numbers of Brazilian troops, 
thus sustaining Brazil’s specific interests. Con-
versely, when the host countries/regions were a low 
priority for Brazilian foreign policy, the UN mis-
sions still attracted Brazilian troops, but with small 
numbers of professionals in the field (supporting 
Brazil’s general interests in promoting global public 
goods, such as international peace and security, yet 
in a more limited way). More specifically, between 
1990 and 2015, Brazil only deployed high numbers 
of military and police to missions in: (a) Haiti 
(78% of all Brazilians deployed in 1990–2015); (b) 
Lusophone countries (14%); and (c) Lebanon (6%). 
Graph 1 clearly demonstrates this proportion.
MINUSTAH has been Brazil’s most prominent 
deployment in terms of personnel, duration and 
political priority. Since the mission’s establishment 
in 2004, Brazil has been in charge of its military 
component and contributed the largest number of 
troops throughout the mission’s existence (Kenkel, 
2015). Besides evidencing Brazil’s growing engage-
ment as a key player in UN PKOs, MINUSTAH also 
brought more visibility to Brazil and contributed 
to the emergence of a Brazilian profile for dealing 
with instabilities and peace efforts. By attaching 
credibility and legitimacy to its own identity as a 
Southern nation, Brazil has sought to shape, chal-
lenge and add to conventional Western practices 
associated with conflict management in multifac-
eted socio-political environments such as Haiti. 
Moreover, the Brazilian diplomacy has been keen 
to underscore the country’s autonomous and non-
aligned posture in international politics, and thus 
its ability and comparative advantage in providing 
conciliatory approaches and promoting the mar-
riage between security and development in peace 
operations’ settings.
Apart from investing more resources, financial and 
human, in UN peacekeeping, in the past few years 
Brazil has also made substantial contributions to 
current debates on the use of force, both in opera-
tions in the field, and in normative discussions 
in New York, Brasília and elsewhere. In the field, 
Brazilian military have been highly praised for their 
behavior during combat operations that led to the 
pacification of hotspots in Haiti’s capital (between 
2005 and 2007). And in New York and Brasília, Bra-
zilian diplomats carefully elaborated and launched 
the concept of “responsibility while protecting” (in 
2011), which promotes the idea that the use of force, 
on behalf of the international community, should 
not be read as a blank check.
The UN Secretariat has clearly understood these 
new approaches and actually welcomed Brazil’s 
demand to play greater roles in peacekeeping. For 
example, in December 2015, the country had two 
Force Commanders, of MINUSTAH in Haiti and of 
MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), and the Commander of the only UN Mari-
time Task Force, UNIFIL in Lebanon, thus leading 
military troops in three of the 16 UN peacekeeping 
missions.2 At the same time, two retired Brazilian 
generals have played unprecedented roles in the UN 
peace and security system: General Paul Cruz has 
been leading strategic planning at the Departments 
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field 
Support (DFS) since 2010, and General Floriano 
Peixoto was a member of the High-Level Panel ap-
pointed by the UN Secretary-General to review UN 
peace operations and recommend ways to improve 
it (2014–2015). These appointments can be under-
stood as a strong recognition of Brazil’s contribution 
to UN peacekeeping.
Once holding a marginal position in the realms of 
international peace and security, Brazil has since 
found more spaces to contribute to and engage in 
peacekeeping. Nevertheless, structural shortcom-
ings still persist. First, there is no comprehensive 
domestic policy orienting the country’s participa-
tion in peace missions. This effectively constrains 
its ability to expand contributions, as decision-
making tends to be slow, burdensome and politi-
cally costly.3 Second, while peacekeeping is a source 
of revenue for many troop contributors due to the 
reimbursement provided by the UN, the compen-
sation corresponds to less than 40% of the total 
costs for Brazil in the operations it participates in. 
Consequently, the country has to draw on domestic 
budgets, which require governmental allocation 
of funds for that specific purpose and subsequent 
parliamentary approval. Hence, it is not uncommon 
that budgetary commitments to missions abroad 
are questioned by political actors or the broader 
domestic public given Brazil’s own domestic issues, 
especially when taking into account the current 
economic downturn affecting the country. Third, 
there is scarce civilian and police participation, 
and female participation has been timid despite 
increases in the last years; a noticeable drawback 
for a country that supports multidimensional PKOs 
in its diplomatic discourses. Fourth, Brazil is cur-
rently the second largest debtor to the UN regular 
budget and, as of 2015, possessed a debt of US$121 
million to the organization’s peacekeeping budget 
(Ninio, 2015). This constrains the country’s ability 
to advocate for normative change and aspire to more 
influential roles in UN fora.
Given the prospective withdrawal of MINUSTAH 
by mid-2017,4 the above-mentioned challenges ren-
der future expressive troop deployment by Brazil 
uncertain. In fact, while the UN has been trying 
to convince the country to deploy elsewhere, the 
current political and economic turbulence at home 
poses further obstacles for significant Brazilian con-
tributions in the near future.
Peacekeeping at the Crossroads
On top of domestic constraints in Brazil, the cur-
rent international arena is marked by a mounting 
sense of disorder, with the presence of hotspots 
and increasing radical extremism, particularly in 
the Middle East and Northern Africa. This further 
contributes to placing contemporary operations at a 
challenging crossroads. The quantitative and quali-
tative expansion of UN peacekeeping in the late 
1990s and throughout the 2000s has led to a series 
of under-achievements as well as an overload and fa-
tigue in the UN system. In far too many situations, 
mismatches in terms of resources and capabilities 
from the very beginning end up posing consider-
able challenges for the effective performance and 
continuation of missions in the field. To adequately 
meet demands, substantial changes are required for 
smarter and better resourced UN PKOs, including 
Security Council mandates that are structured and 
tailored to the situation on the ground, and peace-
keeping actors that are willing and able to enable 
the UN to deliver on the mandate.
Against this backdrop, the UN peacekeeping ap-
paratus has continuously attempted to engage in 
reforms and reviews to strengthen its capacity. The 
most recent effort has been the report of the High-
Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIP-
PO), launched in June 2015 (UN, 2015). Contribut-
ing to a renewed global momentum in responding 
to the challenges of PKOs, and concurrent with the 
UN-wide reviews on the Peacebuilding Architecture 
and on the implementation of Security Council Res-
olution 1325, the HIPPO report highlights major 
gaps between the established peacekeeping doctrine 
and the conduct of current missions on the ground. 
It has exposed fundamental UN doctrine limita-
tions when confronted with increasingly complex 
and volatile conflicts. Similarly, the HIPPO recom-
mendations have laid out as underlying aspirations 
the need for reaching consensus regarding the use 
of force in peace operations and the importance 
of strengthening the credibility of the UN among 
those who are directly affected by its operations. 
Correspondingly, the HIPPO’s key recommenda-
tions are based on the necessity of four shifts: (i) op-
erations need to be more politically sensitive (prima-
cy of politics) to the specific circumstances of each 
case rather than template-driven; (ii) operations 
should be designed to be able to adapt and flexibly 
respond to the context on the ground; (iii) stronger 
and more inclusive peace and security partnerships 
should be built in order to address the tensions in 
operations’ division of labor whereby some states 
tend to design and fund operations while others 
engage with troops; and (iv) deployments have to be 
people-oriented and field-focused, thus carried out 
in consultation with recipient societies at a broader 
level and for their benefit (UN, 2015; Stamnes & 
Osland, 2016).
The momentum generated by the HIPPO report 
needs to be optimized and utilized by the UN 
system and member states, to better prepare and 
deliver UN peace operations, ranging from more 
comprehensive assessments of threats and geo-
graphical conditions, to providing more effective 
infrastructure and technological capabilities. Bra-
zil’s peacekeeping approaches can both contribute 
to and benefit from the recommendations of the 
HIPPO report. In fact, these recommendations 
are very much aligned with the principles, values 
and approaches that currently guide Brazilian for-
eign policy. As a consequence, the HIPPO report 
in many respects ended up reinforcing several of 
Brazil’s interests and positions on the matter. No-
ticeable examples include the primacy of politics 
and emphasis on conflict prevention and mediation, 
the interdependence between security and develop-
ment, greater engagement of troop-contributing 
countries in decision-making, and the explicit cau-














Figure 1: Distribution of Brazilian military and police, November 1990 – December 2015.  
Total: 42,142 professionals (Hamann, 2016).
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Background: The State of UN 
Peacekeeping
The recent 70th anniversary of the United Nations, 
the upcoming selection of a new Secretary-General 
and last year’s release of the report of the High-Lev-
el Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) 
all provide timely opportunities to reflect upon how 
actors engage with one of the UN’s most visible and 
long-standing activities: peacekeeping operations 
(PKOs). Throughout their existence since the late 
1940s, and with mixed successes, PKOs have varied 
in mandate and size, reflecting the changing politi-
cal dynamics of the international system, and they 
have largely evolved based on empirical experiences 
and technological advances.
Although peacekeeping decision-making and main-
stream approaches remain largely influenced  by 
the great powers, the complex demands and expec-
tations facing UN PKOs since the end of the Cold 
War have progressively led to a more pronounced 
and assertive engagement of actors outside the West 
(Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Under these circum-
stances, and reflecting the significant transforma-
tions in both the dynamics and power relations 
within the international system, peacekeeping has 
been increasingly perceived by many Southern 
countries, including Brazil, as a fundamental tool 
with which to seek a greater international profile, 
to gain prestige, and to highlight their support and 
commitment to multilateral institutions (Kenkel, 
2010). With their growing involvement, Southern 
countries have also sought to break the North-South 
paradigm in which “problems” are restricted to the 
South while “solutions” are brought by the North, 
contributing to put forward alternative ideas and 
options, and challenging mainstream peacekeeping 
footprints.
 Brazil’s Evolving Role in Peacekeeping
Brazil has played a key role in UN peacekeeping 
since the 1990s. During the Cold War, the country 
also contributed with a constant, albeit small, num-
ber of military and police since the very first UN op-
eration, in 1947.1 Altogether, Brazil has participated 
in 43 of the 71 peacekeeping missions authorized 
by the UN Security Council, or 61% of the total. 
Throughout these seven decades of engagement, 
the past 25 years – which similarly corresponded 
to peacekeeping’s post-Cold War quantitative and 
qualitative expansion – have been the most signifi-
cant period. This is reflected in the number of mis-
sions that included Brazilian peacekeepers, but also 
in the total number of Brazilians actually deployed 
to UN missions. In December 1990, for example, 
Brazil participated in only three UN peacekeeping 
missions, while in December 2015 this number had 
increased to ten (out of the 16 existing missions at 
the time). In terms of the numbers of troops and 
police, Brazil has sent almost 50,000 uniformed 
personnel to UN peacekeeping missions since 1947, 
the vast majority (87%) being deployed in the past 
25 years alone (Hamann, 2016). In other words, it 
is only recently that Brazil has started to organize 
its engagement in UN peacekeeping as a tool of its 
foreign policy. It is doing so not only to contribute to 
international order, but mainly to promote its inter-
ests regionally and globally, and to expand its role in 
the international system.
This recent engagement can be directly associated 
with the priorities of Brazilian foreign policy, as 
confirmed by disaggregated data on each UN mis-
sion that received Brazilians between 1990 and 
2015. During that period, when the host countries 
and regions were a high priority for Brazil, the UN 
mission received large numbers of Brazilian troops, 
thus sustaining Brazil’s specific interests. Con-
versely, when the host countries/regions were a low 
priority for Brazilian foreign policy, the UN mis-
sions still attracted Brazilian troops, but with small 
numbers of professionals in the field (supporting 
Brazil’s general interests in promoting global public 
goods, such as international peace and security, yet 
in a more limited way). More specifically, between 
1990 and 2015, Brazil only deployed high numbers 
of military and police to missions in: (a) Haiti 
(78% of all Brazilians deployed in 1990–2015); (b) 
Lusophone countries (14%); and (c) Lebanon (6%). 
Graph 1 clearly demonstrates this proportion.
MINUSTAH has been Brazil’s most prominent 
deployment in terms of personnel, duration and 
political priority. Since the mission’s establishment 
in 2004, Brazil has been in charge of its military 
component and contributed the largest number of 
troops throughout the mission’s existence (Kenkel, 
2015). Besides evidencing Brazil’s growing engage-
ment as a key player in UN PKOs, MINUSTAH also 
brought more visibility to Brazil and contributed 
to the emergence of a Brazilian profile for dealing 
with instabilities and peace efforts. By attaching 
credibility and legitimacy to its own identity as a 
Southern nation, Brazil has sought to shape, chal-
lenge and add to conventional Western practices 
associated with conflict management in multifac-
eted socio-political environments such as Haiti. 
Moreover, the Brazilian diplomacy has been keen 
to underscore the country’s autonomous and non-
aligned posture in international politics, and thus 
its ability and comparative advantage in providing 
conciliatory approaches and promoting the mar-
riage between security and development in peace 
operations’ settings.
Apart from investing more resources, financial and 
human, in UN peacekeeping, in the past few years 
Brazil has also made substantial contributions to 
current debates on the use of force, both in opera-
tions in the field, and in normative discussions 
in New York, Brasília and elsewhere. In the field, 
Brazilian military have been highly praised for their 
behavior during combat operations that led to the 
pacification of hotspots in Haiti’s capital (between 
2005 and 2007). And in New York and Brasília, Bra-
zilian diplomats carefully elaborated and launched 
the concept of “responsibility while protecting” (in 
2011), which promotes the idea that the use of force, 
on behalf of the international community, should 
not be read as a blank check.
The UN Secretariat has clearly understood these 
new approaches and actually welcomed Brazil’s 
demand to play greater roles in peacekeeping. For 
example, in December 2015, the country had two 
Force Commanders, of MINUSTAH in Haiti and of 
MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), and the Commander of the only UN Mari-
time Task Force, UNIFIL in Lebanon, thus leading 
military troops in three of the 16 UN peacekeeping 
missions.2 At the same time, two retired Brazilian 
generals have played unprecedented roles in the UN 
peace and security system: General Paul Cruz has 
been leading strategic planning at the Departments 
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field 
Support (DFS) since 2010, and General Floriano 
Peixoto was a member of the High-Level Panel ap-
pointed by the UN Secretary-General to review UN 
peace operations and recommend ways to improve 
it (2014–2015). These appointments can be under-
stood as a strong recognition of Brazil’s contribution 
to UN peacekeeping.
Once holding a marginal position in the realms of 
international peace and security, Brazil has since 
found more spaces to contribute to and engage in 
peacekeeping. Nevertheless, structural shortcom-
ings still persist. First, there is no comprehensive 
domestic policy orienting the country’s participa-
tion in peace missions. This effectively constrains 
its ability to expand contributions, as decision-
making tends to be slow, burdensome and politi-
cally costly.3 Second, while peacekeeping is a source 
of revenue for many troop contributors due to the 
reimbursement provided by the UN, the compen-
sation corresponds to less than 40% of the total 
costs for Brazil in the operations it participates in. 
Consequently, the country has to draw on domestic 
budgets, which require governmental allocation 
of funds for that specific purpose and subsequent 
parliamentary approval. Hence, it is not uncommon 
that budgetary commitments to missions abroad 
are questioned by political actors or the broader 
domestic public given Brazil’s own domestic issues, 
especially when taking into account the current 
economic downturn affecting the country. Third, 
there is scarce civilian and police participation, 
and female participation has been timid despite 
increases in the last years; a noticeable drawback 
for a country that supports multidimensional PKOs 
in its diplomatic discourses. Fourth, Brazil is cur-
rently the second largest debtor to the UN regular 
budget and, as of 2015, possessed a debt of US$121 
million to the organization’s peacekeeping budget 
(Ninio, 2015). This constrains the country’s ability 
to advocate for normative change and aspire to more 
influential roles in UN fora.
Given the prospective withdrawal of MINUSTAH 
by mid-2017,4 the above-mentioned challenges ren-
der future expressive troop deployment by Brazil 
uncertain. In fact, while the UN has been trying 
to convince the country to deploy elsewhere, the 
current political and economic turbulence at home 
poses further obstacles for significant Brazilian con-
tributions in the near future.
Peacekeeping at the Crossroads
On top of domestic constraints in Brazil, the cur-
rent international arena is marked by a mounting 
sense of disorder, with the presence of hotspots 
and increasing radical extremism, particularly in 
the Middle East and Northern Africa. This further 
contributes to placing contemporary operations at a 
challenging crossroads. The quantitative and quali-
tative expansion of UN peacekeeping in the late 
1990s and throughout the 2000s has led to a series 
of under-achievements as well as an overload and fa-
tigue in the UN system. In far too many situations, 
mismatches in terms of resources and capabilities 
from the very beginning end up posing consider-
able challenges for the effective performance and 
continuation of missions in the field. To adequately 
meet demands, substantial changes are required for 
smarter and better resourced UN PKOs, including 
Security Council mandates that are structured and 
tailored to the situation on the ground, and peace-
keeping actors that are willing and able to enable 
the UN to deliver on the mandate.
Against this backdrop, the UN peacekeeping ap-
paratus has continuously attempted to engage in 
reforms and reviews to strengthen its capacity. The 
most recent effort has been the report of the High-
Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIP-
PO), launched in June 2015 (UN, 2015). Contribut-
ing to a renewed global momentum in responding 
to the challenges of PKOs, and concurrent with the 
UN-wide reviews on the Peacebuilding Architecture 
and on the implementation of Security Council Res-
olution 1325, the HIPPO report highlights major 
gaps between the established peacekeeping doctrine 
and the conduct of current missions on the ground. 
It has exposed fundamental UN doctrine limita-
tions when confronted with increasingly complex 
and volatile conflicts. Similarly, the HIPPO recom-
mendations have laid out as underlying aspirations 
the need for reaching consensus regarding the use 
of force in peace operations and the importance 
of strengthening the credibility of the UN among 
those who are directly affected by its operations. 
Correspondingly, the HIPPO’s key recommenda-
tions are based on the necessity of four shifts: (i) op-
erations need to be more politically sensitive (prima-
cy of politics) to the specific circumstances of each 
case rather than template-driven; (ii) operations 
should be designed to be able to adapt and flexibly 
respond to the context on the ground; (iii) stronger 
and more inclusive peace and security partnerships 
should be built in order to address the tensions in 
operations’ division of labor whereby some states 
tend to design and fund operations while others 
engage with troops; and (iv) deployments have to be 
people-oriented and field-focused, thus carried out 
in consultation with recipient societies at a broader 
level and for their benefit (UN, 2015; Stamnes & 
Osland, 2016).
The momentum generated by the HIPPO report 
needs to be optimized and utilized by the UN 
system and member states, to better prepare and 
deliver UN peace operations, ranging from more 
comprehensive assessments of threats and geo-
graphical conditions, to providing more effective 
infrastructure and technological capabilities. Bra-
zil’s peacekeeping approaches can both contribute 
to and benefit from the recommendations of the 
HIPPO report. In fact, these recommendations 
are very much aligned with the principles, values 
and approaches that currently guide Brazilian for-
eign policy. As a consequence, the HIPPO report 
in many respects ended up reinforcing several of 
Brazil’s interests and positions on the matter. No-
ticeable examples include the primacy of politics 
and emphasis on conflict prevention and mediation, 
the interdependence between security and develop-
ment, greater engagement of troop-contributing 
countries in decision-making, and the explicit cau-














Figure 1: Distribution of Brazilian military and police, November 1990 – December 2015.  
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Over the last decade, Brazil has taken a more 
substantial role in international peace and 
security, and has become increasingly in-
volved in UN peace operations. Particularly 
through its participation in Haiti, leading 
the military component of the UN Stabiliza-
tion Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Brazil 
has underscored its growing engagement 
in shaping, challenging and adding to con-
ventional practices of conflict management 
and peace processes. Now, the prospective 
withdrawal of MINUSTAH, coupled with a 
current domestic scenario in Brazil of politi-
cal and economic instability, raises a num-
ber of questions about the future of Brazil’s 
participation and role in peacekeeping. To 
contribute to critical and well-informed con-
versations on the challenges and potentials 
of Brazil’s engagement in peacekeeping amid 
turbulent landscapes at home and interna-
tionally, this policy brief revisits the country’s 
evolving role and strategic use of peacekeep-
ing, and reflects upon its implementation in 
light of the normative developments brought 
by the current international process to review 
UN peace operations. The brief concludes 
that a continued peacekeeping presence, 
despite current difficulties, remains  
desirable for Brazil.
Brazilian Peacekeeping: Challenges and 
Potentials in Turbulent Landscapes  
at Home and Internationally
PRIO POLICY BRIEF 22 2016
PRIO
The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) is a 
non-profit peace research institute (estab-
lished in 1959) whose overarching purpose 
is to conduct research on the conditions for 
peaceful relations between states, groups and 
people. The institute is independent, interna-
tional and interdisciplinary, and explores is-
sues related to all facets of peace and conflict.
Eric Cezne is a PhD Candidate at the Univer-
sity of Groningen and has previously worked 
at PRIO as Research Assistant. 
Email: e.m.cezne@rug.nl
Eduarda Hamann is the Coordinator of the 




The project ‘Brazil’s Rise to the Global Stage: 
Humanitarianism, Peacekeeping and the Quest 
for Great Powerhood’ (BraGS) is funded by 
the Norwegian Research Council’s Latina-
merika program, and aims to understand 
Brazil’s international ambitions through its 








4. The latest report (31 August 2016) of the 
Secretary-General on MINUSTAH recom-
mended the mandate to be extended until 
15 April 2017 (see www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/753)
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same time they should not prevent the country 
from contributing to current and future missions.
Moreover, Brazil’s continued engagement in UN 
PKOs is not only desirable from a foreign policy per-
spective, it is also expected by Brazilian constituen-
cies, primarily the Army, but also the Navy, and by 
key international actors, especially the UN (mainly 
the Secretariat), Western countries and several de-
veloping countries, particularly those who already 
contribute with troops or police. Brazil has been 
able to overcome other domestic challenges before, 
such as in the economic and political recessions 
of the 1990s, and it is much more qualified and 
mature to do it again in present times. While not 
necessarily leading to immediate economic and ma-
terial gains, Brazil’s continued participation in UN 
PKOs remains desirable to showcase the country’s 
capacity and willingness to engage internationally. 
Continued Brazilian participation would not only 
be good news for Brazil’s strategic interests, but also 
for global governance and the future of peacekeep-
ing operations.  
Notes
1. The only exception is between late 1966 and 
early 1989, when Brazil did not participate in 
any international mission, including peace-
keeping. This period more or less coincides 
with the military regime (1964-1985).
2. MONUSCO received a new Force Com-
mander in December 2015.
3. The National Policy of Defense and National 
Strategy of Defense were both revised and 
updated in 2012 (see www.defesa.gov.br/
arquivos/estado_e_defesa/END-PND_Opti-
mized.pdf). Both documents refer to peace-
keeping on only five occasions, to determine 
that Brazil should have more responsibilities 
in UN missions (without details) and to em-
phasize that its participation should be based 
on national interests.
Managing Uncertainties Abroad with 
Uncertainties at Home?
Economic decline and domestic politics on stormy 
waters are present circumstances that raise ques-
tions as to Brazilian commitments abroad, and 
even cast considerable doubts as to the country’s 
not so long ago praised status as a rising power 
on the global stage. Further, the conclusion of the 
impeachment process in August – leading to the 
removal of President Dilma Rousseff and to Vice-
President Michel Temer taking over as Brazil’s head 
of state – did not come without challenging tasks on 
the foreign policy front. In his inaugural speech,5 
Temer’s Foreign Minister José Serra, focusing 
prominently on the country’s struggling economy, 
reinforced a global strategy centered around trade 
and economic-related matters. While not explicitly 
mentioning UN PKOs, Serra suggested that Brazil’s 
international role should avoid engagements that 
generate scarce economic gains at the expense of 
high diplomatic and material costs. Bringing the 
economy back to terms and increasing the country’s 
competitiveness and productivity are understand-
able and much-needed moves under current cir-
cumstances. However, in and of themselves, they 
fall short of promoting the interests and revamping 
the strategic importance of a key political and mili-
tary player on the global stage.
Nevertheless, sustained attention and disposition 
to contribute to UN PKOs in the future should re-
main part of Brazil’s foreign policy portfolio. Brazil 
takes a lot of pride in its contributions to the UN, 
and the organization has brought into effect many 
principles and values that guide the country’s inter-
national role. Similarly, Brasília’s proactive engage-
ment with PKOs is crucial for a richer and more 
comprehensive debate on global security issues, 
contributing to developing knowledge, to balanc-
ing Western dominance and to finding solutions to 
international instabilities. Structural shortcomings 
and uncertainties at home may temporarily restrict 
Brazil from expanding its participation, but at the 
• Brazil has increasingly taken on 
responsibilities and claimed more 
proactive roles in handling crises 
through UN missions.
• Despite Brazil’s increased ability 
to contribute to and engage in 
peacekeeping, a series of structural 
shortcomings constrains the country’s 
ability to advocate for normative change 
and aspire to more influential roles at 
UN platforms.  
• Brazil’s peacekeeping approaches can 
both contribute to and benefit from the 
recommendations of the HIPPO report.
• Notwithstanding the political and 
economic downtrend currently affecting 
the country, sustained attention 
and disposition to contribute to UN 
peacekeeping operations should remain 
part of Brazil’s foreign policy portfolio.
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